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The Beat Should Not Go On: Resisting
Early Calls for Further Extensions of
Copyright Duration
Arlen W. Langvardt*
The campaign began even earlier than I thought it would. No, not
the 2008 presidential campaign, although that one began far too early as
well. Instead, I mean the campaign for yet another extension of
copyright duration.
Mark Helprin, an accomplished novelist, short-story writer, essayist,
and political commentator,' fired an opening salvo in this campaign with2
a 2007 op-ed, A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn't Its Copyright?
Mr. Helprin offers what, at first glance, might seem a sensible proposal
for lengthening copyright duration. Closer analysis reveals, however,
that Mr. Helprin's proposal rests on a shaky foundation of inapt
analogies and questionable public policy notions. In addition, his
arguments contemplate a congressional resort to gimmickry that would
undermine the balance contemplated by the U.S. Constitution's
Copyright Clause, the source of congressional power to legislate
copyrights.3
This Article rejects Mr. Helprin's position on extending copyright
duration. After necessary background discussion, the Article examines
the problems presented by the Helprin proposal 4 and similar proposals
that will be made during the coming years. 5 The Article also exposes the
*

Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.

1. For biographical information on Mr. Helprin and a list of his novels and other
writings, pleasesee his website at http://www.markhelprin.com.
2. Mark Helprin, Op-Ed., A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn't Its Copyright?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, § 4, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
05/20/opinion/20helprin.html.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Helprin, supra note 2. For a critical analysis of the
Helprin proposal, see infra text accompanying notes 18-80.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 25-80.
5. The history of copyright duration extension makes it a certainty that additional
duration extension proposals will be forthcoming. See Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and
Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 436, 450 (2007); Kenneth D. Crews,
Copyright Duration and the Progressive Degeneration of a ConstitutionalDoctrine, 55

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:3

deficiencies in arguments made by duration extension proponents and
explains why calls for further extensions of copyright duration must be
resisted.6
I.

Copyright Basics

A brief discussion of copyright basics must precede an examination
of the problems associated with the Helprin proposal. Copyright
protection attaches to books, other writings, musical compositions,
recordings, works of visual art, and a broad range of other works of
authorship.7 A copyright does not protect the underlying themes, ideas,
or facts presented in the work.8 Instead, the copyright protects the
expression of those themes, ideas, or facts. 9 As a general rule, it is
infringement to use expression from a copyrighted work without the
copyright owner's permission.10 However, the fair use doctrine, which
will not be explored in depth here, creates exceptions to this general noborrowing rule in appropriate instances."'
Because Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Copyright
SYRACUSE L. REv. 189, 233 (2005); Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or

Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the
Freezingof the Public Domainfor PrivateBenefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 193, 28288 (2004).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 81-187. The most recent duration extension
was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(2000).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
8. Id.
9. See id. Brief note should be taken of the headline attached to Mr. Helprin's oped: A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn't Its Copyright? Helprin, supra note 2. If read
by itself, the headline might seem to suggest not only an erroneous belief that copyrights
protect ideas but also a proposal that such idea-protection be made perpetual.
Alternatively, the headline might seem to indicate a proposal for perpetual copyright
protection for ideas, even if ideas are not presently protected. See id. In fairness to Mr.
Helprin, however, the text of his op-ed reveals his understanding of-and lack of quarrel
with-the rule that ideas in a copyrighted work are unprotected, whereas expression in
the work is protected. See id. Mr. Helprin argues for effectively perpetual copyright
protection, but not for making ideas part of what a copyright protects. See id. Any
indications to the contrary in the headline can be chalked up to the likelihood that an
editor, rather than Mr. Helprin, wrote the headline.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501.
11. Id. § 107. If a court holds that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work amounted to fair use, the defendant is not liable even though the copyright owner
did not grant permission for the use. See id.; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994). In determining whether a use is a fair use, courts must weigh
and balance four factors: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used in
relation to the work as a whole; and the effect, if any, on potential markets for the
copyrighted work. Id. For an example of the weighing and balancing done by courts in
fair use cases, see Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. Limited discussion of the fair use doctrine
appears later in this Article at infra text accompanying notes 121-125.

2008]

THE BEAT SHOULD NOT

Go

ON

Clause, specifies that copyright protection granted by Congress must be
for a "limited" time,' 2 Congress cannot make copyright protection
perpetual.13 Copyrights, however, last a very long time, as will be seen
in the immediately following section dealing with the problematic nature
of the Helprin proposal.' 4 When a copyright expires, the underlying
work enters the public domain.' 5 Anyone may use any or all of the
expression from a public domain work and may do so for any purpose,
including a profit-making one. 16 Mr. Helprin does not like this outcome.
He argues emphatically, albeit unjustifiably, for lengthening copyright
duration and postponing the date when public use rights supplant those
of the copyright owner.17
II.

What's Wrong With the Helprin Proposal?

To illustrate how long copyrights last and to place the duration
extension proposal in proper perspective, consider the example of Mr.
Helprin's 1983 novel, Winter's Tale.' 8 Winter's Tale's copyright has
existed for roughly a quarter-century, will continue throughout Mr.
Helprin's° life, 19 and will last for another seventy years beyond his
rule came
passing 20
The "life-of-the-creator-plus-seventy-years"
21

courtesy of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,
which modified what had been a life-plus-fifty-years rule by tacking on
twenty years to the term of copyrights concerning works created in 1978
or later. 22 Mr. Helprin has thus already been granted a twenty-year

12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Id. In later quotations of Copyright Clause language, I will use lower-case first letters
instead of the capital first letters sometimes used by the Framers.
13. Id.; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200, 208, 209-10 (2003); Dastar Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 18-33.
15. Dastar,539 U.S. at 31, 33-34.
16. See id.
17. See Helprin, supra note 2.
18. MARK HELPRIN, WINTER'S TALE (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1983).
Mark Helprin Biography, available at
19. Mr. Helprin was born in 1947.

http://www.markhelprin.com/index.cfm?page=biography.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
21. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(2000) [hereinafter CTEA].
22. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), amended by id. The "life-plus" rule governs duration

of copyrights on most works created in 1978 or later. Id. However, there is a special
duration rule-ninety-five years from first publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever comes first-for copyrights on works-made-for-hire if those works were
created in 1978 or later. Id. § 302(c). Because corporations are often the legal creators
of, and hence owners of copyright on, works-made-for-hire, a duration rule other than
"life-plus" makes sense. See id. The ninety-five-year and 120-year figures noted above
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duration bonus over and above the copyright term contemplated by the
law in existence when he wrote Winter's Tale. In all likelihood, the
copyright on Winter's Tale will exist for a total of at least 100 years, and
perhaps considerably more.2 3 But2 4why stop there, Mr. Helprin asks.
Why not extend the duration again?
The reasons to reject further extension become clearer if we
consider a much older, yet still copyrighted, work: the 1928 "Steamboat
Willie" cartoon, which marked the initial appearance of the Mickey
Mouse character. 25 The Steamboat Willie copyright, owned by the Walt
Disney Co., 26 is governed by a different duration rule that applies only to
pre-1978 works and contemplates a basic term plus a renewal term.27
The law in existence in 1928 called for a maximum of fifty-six years of
copyright protection, which represented the total of the basic term plus
the renewal term. 28 If not for a mid-1970s copyright duration extension
that added nineteen years to the duration of still-existing copyrights,
Disney's Steamboat Willie copyright would have expired at the end of
1984, and the cartoon would, therefore, have entered the public domain
at that time. 29 The nineteen-year extension meant that the Steamboat
resulted from the CTEA's addition of twenty years to the seventy-five-year and 100-year
figures that previously governed the duration of copyrights on works-made-for-hire if
they were created in 1978 or later. Id.
23. The CTEA applied retrospectively to still-copyrighted works created prior to the
CTEA's enactment, and prospectively to works created after the statute's enactment. See
CTEA, supra note 21; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193, 198 (2003). Hence, the
life-plus-fifty-years duration that applied to Mr. Helprin's 1983 novel when he wrote it
became life-plus-seventy-years with the enactment of the CTEA. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
Assuming the sixty-year-old Mr. Helprin, see supra note 19, lives the long life we hope
he will have, the copyright on WINTER'S TALE should have a total duration that easily
exceeds 100 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
24. Helprin, supra note 2.
25. Walt Disney Co., http://disney.go.com/vault/archives/characterstandard/mickey/
mickey.html.
26. Id.; http://home.disney.go.com/guestservices/faqs.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). The text's reference to "a different duration rule
[for] pre-1978 works" is a slight oversimplification, though a harmless one in this
context. The basic term-plus-renewal-term approach governs the duration of copyrights
on works that were created and published prior to 1978. Id. Because the Copyright Act
of 1976 moved to a "life-plus" approach for copyrights on works created in 1978 or later,
see id. § 302(a), a special duration rule was developed for works created prior to 1978 but
not published until 1978 or later, see id. § 303. Because that special rule is of limited
applicability and is not germane to the purposes of this Article, it will not receive further
discussion.
28. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81, amended by
Copyright Act of 1976 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)). The basic term and
renewal term were then each twenty-eight years in length. Id. § 23. Failure to take the
necessary steps to renew during the last year of the basic term meant that the work
entered the public domain at the end of the basic term. See id. § 24.
29. See Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 3, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573 (1976) (current
version at 17 U.S.C. §304 (2000)). Under this mid-1970s' enactment, the renewal term
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Willie copyright would have expired at the end of 2003-except that the
CTEA came to the rescue in 1998 by granting a twenty-year duration

bonus to all still-existing copyrights. 30 As a result, the Steamboat Willie
copyright will continue in force through 2023. 3 1
The duration extensions just described have given Disney quite a
deal: ninety-five years of copyright protection, even though fifty-six
years was the maximum contemplated by the law when the Steamboat
Willie cartoon came into being.3 2 The duration extensions have been far
from a good deal for the public, which must continue seeking permission
from, and paying royalties to, Disney3 3 in order to make uses that should

have become permission-free long ago.
Of course, unlike Disney and the Steamboat Willie situation, the
real benefits of the CTEA's twenty-year duration bonus have not yet
kicked in for Mr. Helprin and his eventual heirs. The fundamental issue,
however, is the same. Should Congress continue to extend copyright

duration, not only for works created after the effective date of the
extension but also for already-created works that are 34still under copyright

protection at the time the extension goes into effect?

that had been twenty-eight years became forty-seven years, thus making seventy-five
years of protection available (twenty-eight-year basic term plus forty-seven-year renewal
term). Id.
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000). The renewal term that had already been
increased from twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, see supra note 29, became sixtyseven years under the CTEA. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), (b). Accordingly, ninety-five
years of protection became available (twenty-eight-year basic term plus sixty-seven-year
renewal term) for qualifying pre-1978 works. See id. As the foregoing discussion
reveals, the CTEA's twenty-year duration boost applied to both sets of duration rules
under consideration here: the rules for works created and published prior to 1978, and the
rules for works created in 1978 or later. Id. §§ 302, 304.
31. By obtaining the benefit of both the nineteen-year duration extension that
occurred in the mid-1970s and the twenty-year bonus added by the CTEA, Disney's
Steamboat Willie copyright enjoys a sixty-seven-year renewal term that is measured from
1956, the year its basic term ended. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30; supra
notes 29-30. The text refers to the Steamboat Willie copyright as existing through 2023
because copyrights run through the end of the relevant calendar year. 17 U.S.C. § 305
(2000).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b); Copyright Act of 1909 § 24. Not surprisingly, given the
economic stakes for the firm, Disney played an influential role in the lobbying effort that
led to the CTEA's enactment. See Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual
Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: Judicial Review of Copyright
Term Extension Legislation, 36 LoY. L. REv. 199, 231, 235 (2002); Langvardt &
Langvardt, supra note 5, at 201-02, 237-38; Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionalityof
the Copyright Term Extension Act: Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial Technique in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 55 SUP. CT. REv. 143, 145 (2003).
33. Failure to obtain a license to use or borrow from the still-copyrighted work
presumably would make the use or borrowing infringing in nature. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106,

501 (2000).
34. The CTEA had such dual effects, see CTEA, supra note 21; Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 193, 198 (2003), as did earlier extensions of copyright duration. Eldred,
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For Mr. Helprin, the answer is an obvious "yes. 35 He created the
works through his considerable skills.36 They are his creations, his
property. 37 Accordingly, Mr. Helprin reasons that he and his heirs (or
any transferees of his copyrights) should indefinitely continue to control
the works' use and exclusively derive the financial benefits that attend
such control.38 In lamenting the consequence that an underlying work
enters the public domain once the work's copyright expires, Mr. Helprin
characterizes this occurrence as a governmental seizure of property. 39 He
goes on to note an apparent inconsistency: the government does not seize
privately owned real estate or other forms of property after a set period
of years.40 If such "total confiscation" does not occur in regard to those
41
forms of property, he asks, why should it occur in regard to copyrights?
Mr. Helprin's fairness argument has surface appeal but comes up
short. Copyright expiration does not amount to a governmental seizure
or to "total confiscation. 42 The government does not take ownership of
the copyright or the underlying work once the copyright duration finally
runs out. 43 The government acquires no entitlement to the financial
benefits that could accompany uses of the work.44 Instead, the work is
opened up for use by the public, 45 which includes Mr. Helprin's distant
heirs. If, for instance, they want to publish a new edition of one of Mr.
Helprin's novels after the copyright expires and decide to make that
edition especially attractive to the purchasing public by writing a new
foreword or other commentary to accompany the text of the novel, no
legal obstacle would prevent them from doing so. Others, of course
46
could do the same, as will be seen. Hence, "total confiscation" does

537 U.S. at 194, 200-01, 204.
35.

See Helprin, supra note 2.

36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34
(2003) (citing Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964), and
explaining that upon the expiration of a copyright, the rights to use the underlying work
pass to the public).
43. See id.
44. See Richard A. Posner, The Eighth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies
Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: Do We Have Too Many Intellectual
PropertyRights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 176-78 (2005).
45. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34. See, e.g., Crews, supra note 5, at 192; Lawrence
Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 56-57, 59-60 (2006);
Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 792-94
(2006).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54, 128-137.
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not occur.
Moreover, Mr. Helprin's argument fails to consider why owners'
rights over their real estate must be perpetual in nature. He appears to
assert that the law respects real property owners more than it respects
creators of copyrighted works.47 But the perpetual nature of rights over
real estate has less to do with respect to owners than with the reality that
the alternatives-automatic government seizure or opening the property
to the public-are neither efficient nor administrable in the real property
context. 48 As for respecting creators of works of authorship, copyright
duration rules that contemplate roughly 100 years of rights, or perhaps
far more, demonstrate considerable respect.
I1. The Creativity-Enhancing Role of the Public Domain
When drafting the Copyright Clause, the Framers of the
Constitution contemplated two ways of enhancing creativity, not just
one. 49 The first way-the focus of Mr. Helprin's op-ed-is to give
creators substantial legal rights over their creations. 50 These rights
provide creators a presumably powerful incentive to create new works. 5'
The other way of enhancing creativity-the one Mr. Helprin fails to
note-stems from the "limited times" language of the Copyright Clause.
In stating that the "exclusive right[s]" granted to creators must be for
"limited times," 52 the Framers envisioned the existence of a rich public
domain made up of works whose copyrights had expired.5 3 The public
would be free to borrow without restriction from public domain works
and to use those works as the foundations of new creative endeavors.54
Mr. Helprin seems not to recognize the constitutional importance of
47. See Helprin, supra note 2.
48. E-mail from Kyle Langvardt, Esq., to Arlen W. Langvardt (May 25, 2007) (on
file with author). See Posner, supra note 44, at 176-79, 180-81.
49. See infra notes 50, 53.
50. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl.8. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (specifying that
copyright owners have rights to the reproduction and distribution of their works, the
preparation of derivative works, and where appropriate, the performance and display of
their works); Helprin, supra note 2 (stressing the importance of substantial and enduring
rights to those who "try to extract a living from the uncertain arts of writing and
composing").
51. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n. 18 (2003); Stadler, supra note 5, at
433-34.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
53. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224-25, 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (commenting on
the broad-ranging public use rights that come into play once the copyrights on underlying
works expire).
54. See Crews, supra note 5, at 229; Lessig, supra note 45, at 56-57; William F.
Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1639-42 (2004); Stadler, supra note 5, at 474-75.
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the Limited Times clause.55 Perhaps he should not be faulted for this
failure or refusal, considering the congressional tendency in recent years
to give short shrift to the public domain side of the Copyright Clause's
enhancement-of-creativity balance. 56 By virtue of the CTEA's twentyyear extension of copyright duration, Congress froze the public domain
in its pre-1998 state. 57 No additional works have entered the public
domain since the end of 1997; none will do so until the public domain
thaw begins on January 1, 2019.58 Mr. Helprin would like Congress to

55.

See generally Helprin, supra note 2.

As already noted, Mr. Helprin favors

lengthening copyright duration even though doing so would postpone the public's
acquisition of the right to make unrestricted uses of works that otherwise would have
entered the public domain. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. As will be seen,

Mr. Helprin regards the "limited time" language as a convenient vehicle by which
Congress may continue to extend copyright duration without making it expressly
perpetual. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64. His approach would drain the
"limited times" language of its more logical meaning and significance. See infra text
accompanying notes 65-66, 73-77.
56. In addition to the CTEA's soon-to-be-discussed harm to the public domain, see
infra text accompanying notes 57-66, Congress has taken other actions that restrict the
flow of works into the public domain. For instance, concerning copyrights on works
created in 1978 or later, Congress adopted a "life-plus" approach and moved away from
the basic-term-plus-renewal model applicable to pre-1978 works. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302(a), 304(a)-(b). One key effect of this change was to limit the rate at which works
entered the public domain. See Crews, supra note 5, at 229. The life-plus approach
meant that copyrights on works created in 1978 or later automatically received the very
lengthy life-plus-seventy duration, whereas under the basic-term-plus-renewal model,
large numbers of works entered the public domain only after the twenty-eight-year basic
term because many copyright owners did not pursue renewal. See Lessig, supra note 45,
at 59-60; Patry & Posner, supra note 54, at 1640. Sometimes the non-renewal occurred
because of a copyright owner's slip-up, but presumably, in many instances, non-renewal
resulted from the copyright owner's conclusion that the underlying work seemed not to
have enough market value to warrant going through the renewal process. Id. at 1640. By
enacting copyright duration extensions such as the CTEA and by eliminating the renewal
feature for copyrights on works created in 1978 or later, Congress struck a "double blow
at the public domain." Id. at 1640. A related additional blow to the public domain
occurred in 1992, when Congress made renewal automatic for any copyrights as to which
filing for a renewal otherwise would have been required. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a); RALPH
S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 531 (West Group 9th ed. 2005).
This meant that for works created and published in 1964 through 1977, the relevant
copyrights were guaranteed to receive the benefit of the renewal term even without a
filing of a renewal application. See id. at 533. Thus, there was no longer any flow of
entries into the public domain stream at the end of the relevant copyrights' basic terms.
See id.; Lessig, supra note 45, at 59-60; Crews, supra note 5, at 229.
57. Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 196, 266-67.
58. Id. Because copyrights run through the end of the relevant calendar year, 17
U.S.C. § 305 (2000), any copyright that still existed in 1998 received the benefit of the
CTEA's twenty-year bonus, see id. §§ 302, 304. As a result, any copyright that would
have expired at the end of 1998 if not for the CTEA will remain in force through the year
2018. See id. Hence, the public domain remains frozen in its pre-1998 state until
January 1, 2019. Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 266-67, 273.
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lengthen the freeze by extending copyright duration again and again.59
In arguing for further extensions of copyright duration, Mr. Helprin
misinterprets the purpose of the Copyright Clause's Limited Times
provision, although he does not ignore that language altogether. He
refers to the Limited Times provision as evidence of the "genius of the
Framers" because it "allows for infinite adjustment. Congress is free to
extend at will the term of copyright." 60 Mr. Helprin goes on to note that
Congress "last did so in 199861[by enacting the CTEA], and should do so
again, as far as it can throw."

Application of the "genius" label to the Framers may be justified for
various reasons, but not for the one offered by Mr. Helprin. He asserts
that the Framers included the "limited times" language in the Copyright
Clause as a way of allowing Congress, if it were so inclined, to string
together successive copyright duration extensions and thereby grant an
enormous period of protection that would still be "limited" because it
would not be expressly perpetual.6 2 Mr. Helprin's preferred approach
seems reminiscent of the questionable copyright duration alternative
supposedly suggested by Motion Picture Association of America
executive Jack Valenti, and later endorsed by Rep. Mary Bono (R-Cal.):
that copyrights should be made to last "forever, less one day."63 In Mr.
59.

See Helprin, supra note 2.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary
Bono). This Article will further explore the unwise, and probably unconstitutional,
nature of the forever-less-one-day approach. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77,
170-171, 177-178. Mary Bono was elected to the House of Representatives to succeed
her late husband, Sonny Bono, the songwriter/entertainer/political figure who served in
the House from 1994 until his death in an early 1998 skiing accident. Sonny Bono
Biography, http://www.filmreference.com/film/61/Sonny-Bono.html; CNN Interactive,
Sonny Bono-From TV to D.C., Jan.

6,

1998, http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/06/

bono.obit.update/; Congresswoman Mary Bono, http://bono.house.gov/Biography/.
Because Sonny Bono had favored lengthy extensions of copyright duration and had
backed the bill that became the CTEA, Congress attached his name to the CTEA as a
"sentimental" gesture when it enacted the statute in October 1998. Posner, supra note 32,
at 147.
Sonny Bono had initially favored making copyright duration perpetual before
learning that a move by Congress to grant perpetual copyright protection would run afoul
of the "limited times" language in the Copyright Clause. See Copyright Term, Film
Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,, 104th
Cong. 94 (1995) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono); 144 CONG REC.H9952 (daily ed. Oct.
7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono). Mary Bono acknowledged that she had been
"informed by staff' of the unconstitutionality of any enactment that would expressly
make copyright protection perpetual. 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Mary Bono). She therefore regarded the CTEA as a good fallback that
fittingly honored her late husband and appropriately moved in the direction of extending
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Helprin's forever-less-one-day view, the Framers displayed their
"genius" by including the Limited Times provision as a means of
ensuring Congress a convenient way to negate any meaningful effect that
same provision otherwise would have had.64 Surely the Framers did not
have such pointlessness in mind.
If the Framers intended to empower Congress to grant extension
after extension and thereby make copyright protection effectively, if not
expressly, perpetual, why would they have included the "limited times"
language at all? If the Framers wanted Congress to have completely free
reign in regard to copyright duration, they simply would have authorized
Congress to enact copyright laws without making any reference to the
duration of the rights to be granted. I, therefore, take a different view of
the Framers' "genius" in putting the "limited times" language in the
Copyright Clause. Rather than including that language as a means of
allowing Congress to resort to Mr. Helprin's gimmick of granting
extension after extension "as far as [Congress] can throw,, 65 the Framers
chose the "limited times" language as a sensible, meaningful mechanism
for establishing the two previously discussed ways of enhancing
66
creativity.
In asserting that "Congress is free to extend at will the term of
copyright," 67 Mr. Helprin no doubt relies on a 2003 U.S. Supreme Court
decision not mentioned in his article: Eldred v. Ashcroft.68 In Eldred,
the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the CTEA, holding that
the statute violated neither the Copyright Clause nor the First
Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee. 69 Even a casual reading of
Eldred, however, reveals the Court's view that the CTEA represented
unwise public policy. The CTEA was a bad idea, the Court appeared to
copyright duration even further. See id. Ms. Bono commented at the general time of the
CTEA's enactment that perhaps Congress should someday consider making copyrights
last "forever, less one day." Id.
64. See Helprin, supra note 2.
65. Id.
66. As noted earlier, one of the ways to enhance creativity involves providing
would-be creators with incentives to create by giving them rights over their creations.
The other way involves creating a rich public domain of works from which others may
freely borrow once the copyrights on those works expire. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-54.
67. Helprin, supra note 2.
68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
69. Id. at 193-222. Although detailed discussion of the Court's rationale for
sustaining the CTEA against constitutional attack is beyond the scope of this Article,
portions of the Court's reasoning in Eldred will be noted later herein. See infra text
accompanying notes 71-76, 174-179; see also infra note 155. For extensive analysis of
Eldred, see Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 32; Paul M.
Schwartz and William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension
and Propertyas ConstitutionalProperty, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003).
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say, but a congressional decision to enact an unwise law does not make
that law unconstitutional.7 °
Further, a careful reading of Eldred reveals that even though -the
Court's reluctance to strike down the CTEA signals broad congressional
latitude to regulate copyright duration,7 ' Congress may not be as free to
"extend at will the term of copyright" as Mr. Helprin suggests. 72 En
route to a conclusion that the CTEA did not violate the Limited Times
provision in the Copyright Clause because the lengthened copyright
terms resulting from the CTEA were not perpetual,7 3 Justice Ginsburg
noted in her majority opinion that there was no indication of a
congressional attempt to use the CTEA as a means to "evade or override"
the Limited Times provision.74
This statement could help fuel
constitutional challenges if Congress does what Mr. Helprin wants and
strings together successive copyright duration extensions. Any such
stringing-together would seem to indicate an intent to "evade or
override" the Limited Times provision and could affect the constitutional
calculus in a future case, given Justice Ginsburg's observation in
Eldred.75 Add into the mix the gist of the Eldred decision-that the
CTEA was an unwise enactment even if it was not unconstitutional 76 and Congress should be too embarrassed77 to participate in the duration
extension charade Mr. Helprin advocates.
70. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208, 222. In her majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg
suggested that the policy determinations made by Congress in enacting the CTEA were
"debatable or arguably unwise." Id. at 208. She also commended those challenging the
CTEA for having "forcefully urge[d] that Congress pursued very bad policy in
prescribing the CTEA's long terms," but stressed that "[t]he wisdom of Congress'
action ... is not within our province to second-guess." Id. at 222.
71. See id. at 199-200, 204-05, 208, 212-13, 216-19, 221-22. The Court's reluctance
to rule the CTEA unconstitutional appears to have stemmed in part from concern over the
practical consequences of striking down the CTEA and from concern that such an action
would imperil the duration extension enacted in the 1970s. See Langvardt & Langvardt,
supra note 5, at 218, 234, 257-59; Posner, supra note 32, at 151-52, 154-55.
72. Helprin, supra note 2.
73. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-200, 208-10. The Court rejected an argument that the
"limited times" requirement of the Copyright Clause was violated by the CTEA because
the lengthened copyright duration called for in the statute gave copyrights essentially the
same economic value that a perpetual copyright would. Id. at 209-10.
74. Id. at 209; see id. at 199-200, 209-10, n. 16 (observations to the same effect).
75. See id. at 209.
76. See id. at 208, 222. Eldred can fairly be seen as a decision in which the Court
unanimously agreed that the CTEA amounted to poor public policy. Seven justices
subscribed to a majority opinion that so indicated, see id., and the two dissenting Justices
clearly thought Congress had dropped the ball in enacting the statute. Of course, the
dissenters regarded the CTEA as both unwise and unconstitutional, see id. at 223-37
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 243-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting), whereas the majority saw it
as merely unwise, see id. at 208, 222.
77. Mr. Helprin is a big name, however. See supra text accompanying note 1. Can
Congress say "no" to famous creators/copyright owners? See infra text accompanying
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Mr. Helprin attempts to enhance the appeal of his proposal by
casting it as a means of benefiting individual creators, including not only
those who have achieved his level of distinction, but also others who
have found fame and commercial success more elusive. 78 Doing so may
be good political strategy, but Mr. Helprin fails to mention that corporate
copyright owners (e.g., Disney) would also stand to benefit. 79 If
Congress were to take the questionable step of extending copyright
duration for individual creators, the Disneys of the world surely would be
included as well. Is fattening the bottom lines of Disney and other
corporate copyright owners so important that we must again postpone the
effective date of the public's Copyright Clause-based entitlement to
unfettered use of already long-protected works? 80
This discussion suggests related questions concerning the effects of
extending copyright duration. First, who would really benefit? Second,
what types of costs would be imposed on the public if copyrights are
continually extended? Third, what sorts of uses of public domain works
would be curtailed?
A.

Who Would Really Benefit From a DurationExtension?

The major beneficiaries of a duration extension would be the very
small percentage of copyright owners-whether individual or
corporate-whose copyrights apply to works that carry significant
economic value in the marketplace for a large number of years.8 1 Only
two percent of copyrighted works retain commercial value in terms of
ability to generate royalties or licensing fees once the works reach fiftyfive years of age. 82 It is safe to assume that various Disney-owned
copyrighted works would be within this two percent.83 Mr. Helprin's
well-received works 84 make it reasonable to expect that there will be
commercial demand for them for many, many years to come. But with

notes 183-187.
78. See Helprin, supra note 2.
79. Corporations own copyrights either because of the work-made-for-hire rule, see
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), or because of a copyright transfer from the individual who
created the work, see id. § 201.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Recall that Disney played a key role in lobbying for
the CTEA. See supra note 32.
81. See EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 8, 12, 15
(1998) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
82. Id. Justice Breyer cited this report and the two percent figure in his Eldred
dissent. Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 248-49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. Why else, one might ask, would Disney have played a key role in the lobbying
effort for the CTEA? See supra note 32.
84. See the list of Mr. Helprin's novels, availableat http://www.markhelprin.com.
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the vast majority of copyrighted works retaining little or no commercial
value by the time they are fifty-some years old 8 5-if they ever had much
commercial value to begin with-a very small subset of copyright
owners would be the ones receiving almost all of the benefit from the
added years of licensing fees that copyright owners could collect if
duration were extended.86 Of course, some licensing fees might show up
on an intermittent basis for owners of copyrights on works that had not
been commercially successful for some time, as the occasional users of
such works would feel a need to seek permission and pay for a license in
order to avoid committing infringement.87 The bulk of the cumulative
financial haul stemming 88from a copyright duration extension, however,
would go to a select few.
Moreover, though Mr. Helprin likes the idea of using a duration

extension as a way to preserve an existing revenue stream for creators'
heirs, 89 protecting creators' distant heirs does not appear to have been a
primary objective of the Framers of the Copyright Clause. 90 If such an
objective motivated the Framers, the "limited times" language was an
odd choice. That language suggests a prohibition on perpetual or very
long-term rights rather than a supposed intent that rights should continue

85.

See CRS Report, supra note 81, at 8, 12, 15.

86.

This was, and continues to be, an effect of the CTEA. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,

537 U.S 186, 248-49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Crews, supra note 5, at 201-02;
Patry & Posner, supra note 54, at 1640-4 1; Posner, supra note 32, at 149.
87. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501.
88. If only two percent of copyrighted works retain commercial value by the time
they reach fifty-five years of age, see CRS Report, supra note 81, at 8, 12, 15, the "select
few" referred to in the text would be, at most, the owners of the copyrights on that two
percent. In all likelihood, the select few would be the owners of the copyrights on an
even smaller percentage of works, given that as works become much older than fifty-five
years, the prospects of their retaining commercial value would seem to diminish even
more. With the extension established by the CTEA, not to mention any further extension
that Congress might enact, copyrights are already guaranteed to last for lengthy periods
that in some instances may easily exceed 100 years. See supra text accompanying notes
18-33.
89. See Helprin, supra note 2.
90. Although it is obvious that the Framers wanted Article I, § 8 of the Federal
Constitution to serve as a grant of power to Congress for the enactment of copyright and
patent laws, there is little evidence from the Constitutional Convention of more specific
intent on the part of the Framers in regard to the Copyright Clause. See Schwartz &
Treanor, supra note 69, at 2381-82; Craig W. Dallon, OriginalIntent and the Copyright
Clause: Eldred v. Ashcroft Gets It Right, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 307, 318 (2006).
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to infer intent from the Article I, § 8 language, the
historical context, and broad public policy positions taken by influential Framers and
other statesmen.
For an example of such an approach to determining the intent
underlying Article I, § 8, see id. at 313-24. See also Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 69,
at 2362-69 (criticizing theories that operate at a high level of generality in their attempts
to determine intent underlying Article I, § 8).
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long enough for creators' distant heirs to benefit. 91
In this context, it is instructive to consider the duration provision in
the Copyright Act of 1790, 92 which was enacted very shortly after the

ratification of the Constitution. With various Framers of the Constitution
serving in Congress at the time of the 1790 enactment, 93 Congress called

for a basic copyright term of fourteen years and an optional renewal term
of fourteen years that could be obtained only if the creator lived all the
way through the basic term. 94 Although the living-to-the-end of the basic

term provision was later dropped and the basic and renewal terms were
subsequently lengthened,9 5 the copyright duration established in the 1790

Act serves as a nearly contemporaneous indication that the Framers were
not especially concerned with benefiting distant heirs of creators. 96 Of
course, heirs benefit from copyrights, but they do so as an offshoot of the

Framers' goal of enhancing creativity through providing creators with
incentives to produce new works. Only in more recent years, when
copyright

durations

have become

so

lengthy through

successive

extensions, has the argument about heirs' financial security been seen as
a supposed purpose underlying the Copyright Clause.97

Remember, too, that Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power
to enact not only copyright laws but also laws regarding the patenting of
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also, e.g., Dallon, supra note 90, at 341
(suggesting that in choosing the "limited times" language of Article I, § 8, the Framers
were motivated by a desire to guard against lengthy printing monopolies that had arisen
under English copyright law).
92. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (differing portions repealed in 1802,
1819, 1831, and 1834).
93. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200-01, 213 (2003); Langvardt &
Langvardt, supra note 5, at 268-69.
94. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See Stadler, supra note 5, at 439;
Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 197.
95. For summaries of the history of copyright duration extensions from 1831
through the 1998 enactment of the CTEA, see Stadler, supra note 5, at 439, 460-63;
Crews, supra note 5, at 205-07, 228; Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 196-206;
Posner, supra note 32, at 144-45.
96. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. If the Congress of 1790 had been
motivated by a desire to benefit such heirs of creators, they presumably would have
crafted the renewal provision differently and would have made it considerably lengthier.
See id.; c.f Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 268-69 (arguing that the duration
provision in the Copyright Act of 1790 should serve as a nearly contemporaneous
indication of what the Framers of the Copyright Clause meant by "limited times");
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200-01, 213 (concluding that early copyright enactments by Congress
amount to nearly contemporaneous indications that the Framers of the Copyright Clause
would not have objected to retrospective applications of duration extensions).
97. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) regarding the bill that became the CTEA). Cf Dallon, supra note
90, at 351 (arguing that the Supreme Court's Eldred holding was correct in regard to the
constitutionality of the CTEA, but that the CTEA, insofar as it was meant to benefit
grandchildren of creators, was too heavily weighted in favor of private interests).
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inventions.
If preserving distant heirs' ability to profit from their
ancestors' copyrighted creations has become so important, would Mr.
Helprin like to see patents treated similarly in regard to duration? Would
he agree that what is supposedly good for the copyright goose is also
good for the patent gander? Patents exist for twenty years from the filing
of the patentee's application, 99 a far shorter duration than for
copyrights, 100 and clearly not long enough for distant heirs of the
inventor to become entitled to collect royalties. Yet no clamor has
emerged for a lengthening of patent duration. Compared with its
approach regarding copyright, Congress has paid greater respect in the
patent realm to the Article I, Section 8 balance between enhancing
creativity through providing incentives to create and enhancing creativity
by eventually enabling others
to use formerly protected matter as a basis
01
for new creative activity.'
I make no attempt to assert that Congress should drastically slash
copyright duration, even on a prospective basis.10 2 I also recognize that
the less-than-monopoly rights associated with copyrights suggest a need
for longer terms than are appropriate for the monopoly rights associated
with patents. 103 Even so, the relatively newfound concern over copyright
owners' heirs seems more a transparent attempt to take advantage of lax
congressional attention to the public domain's importance in the
copyright context 10 4 than a principled argument rooted in the purposes
underlying Article I, Section 8's grant of power to enact copyright and
patent laws.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, § 8 empowers Congress to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

Id.

(emphasis added).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2007).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 18-33.
101. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (establishing patent owner's right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling a patented invention or substantially similar version until
the patent expires). See also id. § 112 (requiring a patent applicant to provide a
specification setting forth details of the invention, so that a person reasonably skilled in
the field can reproduce the invention upon expiration of the patent).
102. A retrospective application of a reduction in copyright duration-i.e., an
application to copyrights on already existing works-would raise concerns about
unconstitutional takings of property. Crews, supra note 5, at 231-32. A prospective
application of a duration reduction-i.e., an application to copyrights on works created
after the effective date of the reduction measure-would not raise constitutional
concerns, but would probably be unrealistic politically. Accordingly, I stop short of
advocating a prospective reduction in copyright duration.
103. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003). Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 106,
107 (granting rights to copyright owner but making those rights subject to fair use, by
others) with 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (granting patent owners exclusive rights to exclude
others from making, using, or selling a patented invention during existence of patent).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 52-66; see supra note 56.
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What Costs Would Result From a Duration Extension?

Next, consider the second of the three questions identified earlier:
what types of costs would be imposed on the public if Mr. Helprin's
copyright duration proposal were enacted? Costs taking the form of
licensing fees for an additional period of years-say, twenty more years,
if Congress would choose to follow the regrettable example of the
CTEA-have already been noted.10 5 For twenty additional years, the
public would be expected to pay for the right to use works that should
have become freely available for use under the bargain drawn by the
Copyright Act.10 6 By granting earlier extensions, such as the CTEA and
a similar extension in the mid-1970s, Congress has already unreasonably
postponed the ability of the public to exercise the rights it is supposed to
have. 0 7 It is no answer to say that there are plenty of works in the public
domain already and that successively delaying the entry of further works
into the public domain is only a minor inconvenience. The "limited
times" language of the Copyright Clause suggests a public domain that is
to be continually enriched with new entries as copyrights on underlying
works expire. 10 8 Congress must recognize that the Copyright Clause
contemplates rights not only for copyright owners but also for the
public.' 0 9 The public's rights were shuttled aside when Congress enacted
extensions to copyright duration." 0
The economic costs of additional years of the licensing fees
described above would likely be in the hundreds of millions of dollars
each year."' When one remembers the previously noted objection that a
very small percentage of copyright owners would realize the bulk of the
financial gains from a copyright duration extension, 1 2 the imposition of
such substantial costs on the public becomes especially hard to justify.
In forcing the public to yield a use right it is entitled to have so that an
105. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
106. See id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 18-34.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
109. See id. See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23, 33-34 (2003) (noting the importance of the public's right to make unrestricted use of
works when copyrights on them expire).
110. See Crews, supra note 5, at 228-29, 231-32; Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note
5, at 240-42, 282, 288.
111. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 81, at 8, 12, 15; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248-49 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). In his Eldred dissent, Justice Breyer observed that the two percent of
copyrighted works retaining commercial value after they reach fifty-five years of age
produce approximately $400 million per year in royalties. Id. See RAPPAPORT, supra
note 81, at 8, 12, 15.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. As noted earlier, only two percent of
copyrighted works have meaningful commercial value beyond the fifty-five-year point.
See supra text accompanying note 82.
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exceedingly valuable economic benefit 1 3 could be conferred, for the
most part, on a select circle of copyright owners,14 another duration
extension should be seen as failing a cost-benefit test."
But what about the other creators for whom Mr. Helprin professes
concern: the creators who produced fine work but for whatever reason
did not achieve financial success? 15 Mr. Helprin would be pleased to let
those creators' distant heirs collect licensing dollars if, by chance,6
someone wants to use their ancestors' work many years down the road."
Why, however, should Congress do that? Our copyright and patent laws
do not guarantee commercial success to creators of copyrighted works or
inventors of patented items. Some will achieve success, but many will
not. If we do not guarantee creators commercial success, there is no
reason to distort our intellectual property laws by inserting provisions
that throw a financial bone to creators' distant heirs. Put somewhat
differently, why should we extend copyright duration in an effort to
create a licensing market for works as to which little or no such market
previously existed, especially when doing so would require Congress to
ignore the public use rights contemplated by the Copyright Clause?
There are other duration extension-related costs besides the
economic ones noted above. Another duration extension-again, take
twenty years for illustrative purposes-would require members of the
public to hunt down the current copyright owner to secure permission for
a use that would have been freely available absent the extension. 117 The
costs in time and effort may be more significant to the would-be user
than the licensing fee that would have to be paid if the copyright owner is
located. 1 8
Further, the importance of that "if' should not be
underestimated. The very lengthy copyright duration we already have,
not to mention the duration bonus Mr. Helprin advocates, leads in some
instances to uncertainty over the current copyright owner's identity and
113. To the extent that a duration extension's economic benefit goes to the owner of a
copyright on a work that had been created prior to the enactment of the extension, the
economic benefit is a "windfall." Posner, supra note 32, at 147; Crews, supra note 5, at
230.
114. See Posner, supra note 32, at 149; Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 237
(each commenting on the CTEA's probable failure to pass a cost-benefit test). There are
See infra text
also non-economic costs associated with a duration extension.
accompanying notes 117-120.
115. See Helprin, supra note 2.
116. See id.
117. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying
notes 32-33.
118. Crews, supra note 5, at 200-04. See Patry & Posner, supra note 54, at 1640-43;
Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 264; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249-52 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Sometimes the copyright owner may be located after considerable effort, but
the copyright owner is unwilling to grant a license. Crews, supra note 5, at 204.
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contact information. This uncertainty may cause an exasperated wouldbe user to forego using a copyrighted work she wanted to use in her own
creative endeavor out of fear that using the still-copyrighted work
without permission could prompt the copyright owner to come out of the
woodwork and sue for infringement.1 19 Accordingly, the would-be
user's creative effort suffers, as does the creative process itself. Such a
result is inconsistent with the Copyright Clause's objective of
public domain of works from which the public can
establishing a rich
20
1
borrow.
freely
One might expect copyright duration extension proponents such as
Mr. Helprin to respond to the above criticisms by noting that the fair use
defense sometimes protects uses of copyrighted works despite the lack of
a license for the use. 121 Duration extension advocates may also contend
that, in any event, users are always free to borrow ideas and facts (as
opposed to expression) from copyrighted works. 122 Given the existence
of the fair use defense and the idea-versus-expression distinction, why
not lengthen copyright duration?
The unpredictability of the fair use defense serves as one reason not
to extend duration. Answers to fair use questions come in varying
shades of gray rather than black or white. 23 Fair use cases are highly
fact-specific, making reliance on the defense a risky proposition for users
of copyrighted works. 2 4 Whether a use is a "fair use" cannot reliably be
determined until after expensive litigation, even if the defendant
119. See Crews, supra note 5, at 200-04; Posner, supra note 32, at 148; Patry &
Posner, supra note 54, at 1642; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Cf
Lessig, supra note 45, at 59-60 (commenting on the frequent difficulty of determining

whether a work is in the public domain).
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
122. See id. § 102. In Eldred, the Court cited the fair use doctrine and the ideaversus-expression distinction as reasons why there was no need to subject the CTEA to a
First Amendment analysis. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
123. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (noting

that "bright-line rules" do not govern fair use analysis, which of necessity must be of the
case-by-case variety); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 552 (1985) (noting that fair use analysis must be tailored to the facts and
circumstances of the particular case).
124.

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. Although uses

for purposes such as criticism or comment, news reporting, and teaching, scholarship, and
research tend to be good candidates for fair use treatment, uses for such purposes clearly
are not guaranteed to be fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. In determining whether a use
constitutes fair use, courts must consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances and
must weigh and balance certain factors. See id; see also supra note 11.

A convincing

argument might be made that if a user of a copyrighted work has made a good faith, but
unsuccessful, effort to locate the copyright owner, fair use principles should be broadly

applied by courts when the user is sued for infringement. See Patry & Posner, supra note
54, at 1643-58. There is no guarantee, however, that such an argument would prevail.
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ultimately succeeds with a fair use argument. 2 5 Hence, the potential
availability of the fair use defense would not sufficiently ameliorate the
harm that another copyright duration extension would produce.
Neither would the idea-versus-expression distinction. 2 6 Telling a
would-be user that she may borrow general ideas or facts from a
copyrighted work means little if her creative activity would have been
enhanced by the freedom to borrow expression. If the work would have
been in the public domain absent the duration extension, the extension
has deprived the would-be user of her right to borrow expression,
27
regardless of whether the borrowing would have amounted to fair use.
C.

What Uses Would a Duration Extension Restrict?

The above discussion leads logically to the third question listed
earlier: what uses of public domain works would be curtailed by the
Helprin proposal? Mr. Helprin chooses the most objectionable usefrom his perspective and probably that of his readers-and stops there.
He cites the example of the publishing company that takes the text of a
public domain book, releases an edition of the book without adding any
new material, and makes a great deal of money because of the skills and
creative efforts of the long-deceased author. 128 A copyright duration
extension would forestall what Mr. Helprin regards as mere moneygrubbing. 129 Yet such an action by a publisher rests comfortably within
the Article I, Section 8 public domain concept, despite the fact that the
author's skills and efforts decades earlier made it all possible. 130 Such an
action is no different from what happens upon the expiration of a patent.
When a patent expires, competitors of the former patentee are free to
profit from their production and sale of exactly the same invention. 131

125.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 252-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(asserting that the potential availability of the fair use defense was not a good reason to
sustain the CTEA against constitutional attack).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). For a brief discussion of the idea-versus-expression
distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
127. Borrowing from a public domain work may be of any portion--or all-of the
work and may be engaged in for any purpose. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31, 33-34 (2003).
128. Helprin, supra note 2.
129. Id.
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31, 33-34.
131. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2007) (patent owner entitled to exclude others from
making, using, or selling patented invention or substantially similar version until patent
expires). See also id. § 112 (patent applicant must provide specification setting forth
details of invention, so that a person reasonably skilled in the field can reproduce
invention upon expiration of patent); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (noting that "[iun general, unless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying"); id. at 25-26,
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Actions of this sort are clearly contemplated by Article I, Section 8.132
Other uses of public domain works differ from the later-editionwith-nothing-new use complained of by Mr. Helprin. To take examples
dealing with novels or other books, there is the later edition that does
include something new, such as a foreword or preface, a critical essay, or
illustrations. Or there is a new version that modernizes the public domain
version, offers an alternative ending to the story, or does something else
to revitalize interest in the underlying public domain work. What about
the historian whose book necessitates ready access to and use of public
domain works? Then there is the moviemaker who plans to base a film
on a public domain novel or story.1 33 All of these uses and many similar
ones involve the addition of considerable creative content over and above
the original work and are thus consistent with the enhancement-ofcreativity purpose underlying the Copyright Clause.' 34 And every one of
them would be curtailed or effectively eliminated, absent the permission
of the duration-extended copyright's owner, if the Helprin proposal of
successive duration extensions comes to fruition.
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned that, at some reasonable
point, the copyright owner's control over the underlying work would end
and the public's use rights would become paramount. 3 5 In arguing for
continued delays in the arrival of that time, Mr. Helprin proposes a formover-substance approach that may comply with the Copyright Clause's
literal language' 36 but would effectively negate a key component of the

29-30, 32, 34-35 (holding that trade dress principles cannot be used in an effort to impose
liability on a copier of a functional feature of an item whose patent has expired). As
noted earlier, see supra text accompanying note 99 (patents exist for twenty years from
the filing of the patent application). 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). For discussion of the much
longer duration of copyrights, see supra text accompanying notes 18-32.
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31, 33-34; TrafFix, 532
U.S. at 29.
133. For discussion of such uses of public domain works, see Patry & Posner, supra
note 54, at 1640-42. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 249-53, 266 (2003)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The example of a moviemaker's use of a public domain novel or
story highlights the irony of Disney's influential role in lobbying for the CTEA, see
supra note 32, and in its probable reprise of that role when upcoming calls for further
extensions of copyright duration are issued. The irony lies in Disney's support of
duration extensions that restrict the public domain, even though Disney has been a major
beneficiary of the public domain in making its film versions of underlying works that are
no longer protected by copyright. Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 264 n.398.
Having benefited from the public domain, Disney evidently sought to make sure that
"nobody could do to Walt Disney what Walt Disney did to the Brothers Grimm."
Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at the Open Source Convention, July 24, 2002,
availableat http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/l 5/lessig.html.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
135. See Crews, supra note 5, at 230-32, 250.
136. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-200, 208-10.
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37
balance of rights called for in the clause.1

IV. The Incentives Question
Clearly not enamored with the public domain concept contemplated
in the Copyright Clause, 3 8 Mr. Helprin prefers to focus on the
constitutional language empowering Congress to "promote the progress
of science and the useful arts" by granting exclusive rights to creators. 139
As noted earlier, these rights presumably provide creators incentives to
create. 40 Hence, copyright enactments by Congress must meet an
"incentive test" in order to satisfy Article I, Section 8.1'' Let us consider,
then, the question of incentives in regard to the duration extension
proposed by Mr. Helprin.
Answering the incentives question fully requires a look at both
retrospective and prospective applications of the proposed duration
extension. Retrospective application would mean that the extension
would apply to copyrights on already created works, so long as the
copyrights on those works had not already expired. 42 Prospective
application would mean that the extension would apply to copyrights on
works created after the enactment of the duration extension. 143 Previous
duration extensions enacted by Congress have applied both
retrospectively and prospectively.144 For instance, the CTEA applied
retrospectively to unexpired copyrights on works created before the
enactment's 1998 effective date, as well as prospectively to copyrights
on works created after the 1998 effective date. 45 Surely Mr. Helprin
would favor, as would Disney et al., both retrospective and prospective

137.

See supra text accompanying notes 52-66.

The CTEA, though "held to be

constitutional [in Eldred]... arguably functions in a most unconstitutional manner."
Crews, supra note 5, at 231. A similar observation could be made about the Helprin
proposal if it would become law: perhaps constitutional under Eldred, but likely to
function in a "most unconstitutional manner," id., when one considers the balance set up
by the Copyright Clause. I say "perhaps constitutional" because, as previously noted, see
supra text accompanying notes 71-75, congressional action to implement the Helprin
proposal could be seen as an attempt to string together extensions-something that might
affect the constitutional analysis. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-200, 209-10 & n. 16.
138. See Helprin, supra note 2.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Helprin, supra note 2.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
141. See Stadler, supra note 5, at 433-34.
142. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193, 198 (stressing that the petitioners' constitutional
challenge was restricted to the CTEA's application to already created works).
143. See id. at 193 (noting that the petitioners in the case were not challenging the
constitutionality of the CTEA's application to works created after the effective date of the
statute).
144. Id. at 194, 200-01, 204.
145. See CTEA,supra note 21; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
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146
applications of any further duration extensions that might be enacted.
Assume, then, that Congress is considering enacting a copyright
duration extension as we approach January 1, 2019, when the current
public domain freeze is scheduled to thaw and Disney's Steamboat
Willie copyright will enter its last few years of existence absent a
duration extension. 147 Such a proposed extension presumably would
follow the model of the CTEA. 14 ' Also, assume that this hypothetical
bill, which I will call the "Beat Goes On Act" (BGOA), 149 contemplates a
twenty-year extension that would apply both retrospectively and
prospectively.
For illustrative purposes, consider again Mr. Helprin's 1983 novel
Winter's Tale.15 0 If enacted, the BGOA would extend the duration of the
copyright on Winter's Tale, an already created and still-copyrighted work
as of the time of the enactment of the duration extension. 5' In this
example, would the proposed BGOA have furnished Mr. Helprin an
incentive to write Winter's Tale? Of course not, given the obvious fact
that he wrote the novel many years before the making of the duration

146. Without retrospective application, their preexisting works would not be covered
by the extension. Retrospective application of the CTEA was of considerable benefit to
Disney, see supra text accompanying notes 25-33, so Disney et al. logically would favor
retrospective application of any future extensions. Nothing in Mr. Helprin's op-ed
suggests that he favors only prospective-as opposed to prospective and retrospectiveapplication of the further extension he advocates. See Helprin, supra note 2.
147. For an explanation of the public domain freeze brought about by the CTEA, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text. The Steamboat Willie copyright's duration saga is
chronicled at supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
148. CTEA, supra note 21.
149. The title of the hypothetical proposed enactment alludes to The Beat Goes On, a
song written by Sonny Bono and registered with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1966.
SALVATORE (SONNY) BONO, THE BEAT GOES ON (1966); Salvatore (Sonny) Bono, The
Beat Goes On, U.S. Copyright Regis. No. RE-680-278 (renewal registration, Jan. 24,
1994) (original registration no. EU972894, Dec. 30, 1966). The famous singing duo
Sonny & Cher made a hit recording of The Beat Goes On. SONNY & CHER, THE BEAT
GOES ON (Atlantic Records 1967). See The Beat Goes On & On & On & On,
http://www.epinions.com/content_3427442820 (last visited July 24, 2007). It seems
fitting to use the "Beat Goes On Act" title for the hypothetical duration extension
proposal discussed in the text, not only because of the reference to Bono in the CTEA's
title but also because Bono advocated lengthy duration extensions when he learned that
the proposal he really favored-perpetual copyright duration-would be unconstitutional.
See supra note 63. As noted earlier, Bono's widow, Mary Bono, expressed essentially
the same preferences regarding copyright duration in her role as Bono's successor in the
House of Representatives. She also spoke favorably of the "forever, less one day"
approach to copyright duration. See id. and accompanying text.
150. HELFRIN, supra note 18.
151. By virtue of the CTEA's life-plus-seventy-years rule, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2000), and Mr. Helprin's very much alive status, see supra note 19, the copyright on
Winter's Tale would still be relatively young when Congress enacts the hypothetical
BGOA.
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extension proposal.152 What about Disney and the Steamboat Willie
copyright? Again, the BGOA would apply to the copyright even though
the BGOA could not have provided an incentive for the creation of the
underlying 1928 cartoon. 153 Viewed through the lens of Article I,
Section 8 and its incentive test,' 54 the impossibility of furnishing
incentives to create already created works would leave the retrospective
application of the BGOA as simply a huge bonus to owners of copyrights
on preexisting but still copyrighted works. 55 As demonstrated earlier,
this bonus would come at significant cost to the public and in derogation
of the public's use rights in the copyright bargain envisioned by Article I,

Section 8.156
A prospective application of the hypothetical BGOA would seem at
first glance to fare better under the incentive test. In theory, a duration

152. The same was true of the CTEA, whose 1998 duration extension applied to the
copyright on the already created Winter's Tale. See supra text accompanying note 23.
153. Similarly, the CTEA and a mid-1970s duration extension applied to the
Steamboat Willie copyright despite the impossibility of those enactments furnishing any
incentive to create the 1928 cartoon. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
154. See Stadler, supra note 5, at 433-34. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 21213, 222 (2003); id. at 224-25, 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 254-57 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Of course, the Eldred majority and the dissenters disagreed over whether the
CTEA violated Article I, § 8, see supra text accompanying notes 69-70, but there was no
disagreement over whether the Framers envisioned copyright laws as a way by which
Congress could stimulate the creation of new works.
155. The dissenters in Eldred expressed the same concern about the CTEA. See
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226-27, 234-38, 240-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 248-52, 257,
266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Faced with the troubling reality that the CTEA could not
have furnished any incentive to create works that had already been created, the Eldred
majority finessed the incentives issue. It did so by holding that, instead of subjecting
each individual copyright enactment by Congress to a provision-of-incentives inquiry, the
relevant test for purposes of the Copyright Clause should be whether the overall system
of copyright protection enacted by Congress would generally tend to promote creative
activity. See id. at 212-13, 222. Under this focus on the system, the CTEA passed the
test because, of course, the overall legislative scheme of rights in the copyright realm
would tend to enhance creativity. See id. The system focus can be criticized on the basis
that it makes the test too easy for the government to pass, because the overall scheme's
undisputed tendency to enhance creativity will effectively insulate from constitutional
scrutiny the individual enactments within that scheme even if some of those enactments
simply give a bonus to owners of copyrights on already created works. See Langvardt &
But Eldred is the law.
The lack-ofLangvardt, supra note 5, at 264-65.
incentives/granting-of-a-bonus argument, therefore, is not one that can be used
successfully to attack a retrospectively applied duration extension as unconstitutional.
However, such an argument should still have resonance when it is used-as it is here-as
a reason why a further duration extension would be unwise public policy and should not
be enacted by Congress. Even the Eldred majority, after all, had serious concerns about
the wisdom of the CTEA. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208, 222.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 81-127. See also Stadler, supra note 5, at
436, 440, 456-69 (exploring copyright owners' continuing advocacy of ever-greater
rights and congressional tendency to respond with grants of such rights, with the effect of
restricting the public's entitlement to use underlying works).
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extension's promise of a longer period of copyright protection could
furnish a would-be creator an incentive to create a work he might not
otherwise have created. Given the already very lengthy duration of
copyright protection, however, it seems far more likely that an enactment
such as the proposed BGOA would furnish no incentive beyond what
was already present, or at most would offer only a very small marginal
incentive.157 Take the hypothetical alluded to by Mr. Helprin, and
assume that he is pondering whether to write the Great American
Novel. 158 If he writes the Great American Novel under the current set of
duration rules, he can expect that the copyright will run for the remainder
of his life plus seventy years. 159
Although Mr. Helprin tries
unsuccessfully to make the case for allowing his heirs to benefit from his
creative efforts for more than seventy years after he passes on,160 the real
significance of Mr. Helprin's Great American Novel example lies in its
usefulness for purposes of the incentive test. If Mr. Helprin is seriously
considering writing the Great American Novel, one can be confident that
his thought process will not proceed along the following hypothetical
lines:
If I write the Great American Novel, the copyright will only last for
the rest of my life plus seventy years. That is not enough to convince
me I should write. It is not worth the trouble under a life-plusseventy setup. But if Congress were to make copyright duration
longer and guarantee, say, life-plus-ninety in terms of rights, I would
see the situation differently. In that event, I would write the Great
American Novel.
157. See Stadler, supra note 5, at 465-66; Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at
248-51; Posner, supra note 32, at 151 (all making lack-of-meaningful-additionalincentive observations in regard to the CTEA and its prospective application). See also
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254-5, 265-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that any marginal
incentive furnished to creators by the CTEA's prospective application would be
exceedingly small and should be seen as insufficient to support duration extension). In
Eldred, only Justice Breyer's dissent addressed the incentives question in regard to the
CTEA's prospective application. See id. The Eldred majority avoided engaging in such
a discussion by pointing out that, in their appeal to the Supreme Court, Eldred and the
other petitioners had chosen to direct their constitutional attack only against the CTEA's
retrospective application. Id. at 193, 198, 221-22. In the lower courts, the constitutional
challenge had been directed toward the prospective application as well as the
retrospective application. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
aff'd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Presumably, however, a
Supreme Court inclined to hold the CTEA constitutional in its retrospective application
would say the same thing about its prospective application. Even so, the argument that
the hypothetical BGOA would provide essentially no added incentive in its prospective
application should help support the view that such an enactment would be unwise-even
if constitutional-and should therefore be avoided by Congress.
158. Helprin, supra note 2.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
160. See Helprin, supra note 2.
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I hope Mr. Helprin writes the Great American Novel. Whether he
writes it, however, almost certainly will not depend upon whether the
duration of the copyright will be measured under the present life-plusseventy rule or under some later duration extension Congress might
unwisely enact. A life-plus-ninety regime would furnish him (and
similarly situated would-be creators) either no creative incentive beyond
the incentive already provided by the life-plus-seventy rule, or a
marginal incentive so tiny that it should not be seen as sufficient enough
to justify the significant rights-postponing and cost-inducing effects a
6
further duration extension would have in regard to the public. ' '
In addition, notwithstanding the familiar Samuel Johnson remark
62
that only a "blockhead" would write for reasons other than money,1
writers and other creators are prompted to engage in creative work by
considerations other than copyright protections. To take a nonexclusive
list, creators may be motivated by expressive impulses, notions of selffulfillment, and desires to enlighten and entertain others.163 Copyrights
are important, but given the very lengthy duration they already have and
other creative motivations of the sort just noted, we do not need yet
another copyright duration extension to encourage creative output. Such
output will be there in ample supply, and potentially in even greater
supply, 64 if Congress resists the call to make copyrights last longer than
they already do.
One further incentive-related question merits consideration. Would
another copyright duration extension furnish the heirs of a long-deceased
creator any significant incentive to engage in creative activity? In
general, such heirs would seem to have the same incentives to create
which any scheme of copyright protection provides to any would-be
creators-no more, no less. One might argue, however, that further
extensions of copyright could even furnish a disincentive to heirs of
long-deceased creators to engage in their own creative activity. Why
should a distant heir create a new work himself when he can continue to
collect royalties and licensing fees for even more years on the basis of
great-great-grandma's creative efforts way back when? 65 This argument

161.
162.

See supra note 157.
JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, vol. vi, chap. iii (1776).

163. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946-47 (2006); Posner,
supra note 44, at 180.
164. If the flow of works into the public domain resumes and is allowed to continue,

creative output should increase as public domain works furnish the basis of new creative
activity. See supra text accompanying notes 52-66.
165. The "great-great-grandma" example is not a stretch. Even without the duration
extension proposed by Mr. Helprin, the life-plus-seventy-years

rule that applies to

copyrighted works created in 1978 or later, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), will lead with
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sounds harsh but highlights the probability that lengthening copyright
duration will do nothing to enhance creativity.
It is understandable why a gifted writer such as Mr. Helprin, chafing
at the idea that others will eventually have unrestricted ability to use and
reproduce his copyrighted works, would like to see his heirs benefit from
his creations for a longer period of time. I have less sympathy for
copyright owners in the same sort of position in which Disney finds itself
regarding the Steamboat Willie copyright, 166 though I acknowledge the
economic considerations that prompt Disney and other similarly situated
1
copyright owners to favor ever-lengthening copyright duration. 67
Article I, Section 8 commands, however, that copyright protection on
any given work must end at some reasonable point, so that the public
may freely use the work. 168 In the balance drawn by the Copyright
Clause, such use by the public is just as important a way of enhancing
169
creativity as is a copyright system that grants rights to creators.
V.

Suggestions to Congress

Mr. Helprin proposes what amounts to a "forever, less one day"
approach in which Congress continues to extend copyright duration
without making it expressly perpetual. 170 This gimmick, to which Disney
and other corporate copyright owners would surely subscribe if they
thought it would pass muster, would make a mockery of the Copyright
Clause's "limited times" language and would decimate the public's use
rights contemplated by the Framers. 171 As noted earlier, Mr. Helprin has
already received one twenty-year duration bonus in regard to the

considerable frequency to copyrights that last far longer than 100 years. See supra text
accompanying notes 18-23.
166. Recall that, concerning the Steamboat Willie copyright, Disney has already
qualified for two lengthy duration extensions. By virtue of those extensions, Disney has
been guaranteed ninety-five-years of protection even though, under the law existing when
Steamboat Willie came into existence and for decades afterward, Disney's rights were to
have ended-and the public's were to have begun-at the fifty-six-year mark. See supra
text accompanying notes 25-34. Why should Disney and similarly situated copyright
owners be allowed to hit the jackpot a third time?
167. As Professor Stadler has noted, the granting of greatcr rights to copyright owners
has led to a circle of expectations in which copyright owners, having received expanded
rights, then want more (and ever-expanding) rights in order to maximize control over
their underlying works. Stadler, supra note 5, at 435-38.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (stressing the importance of the public's rights to
make unrestricted use of formerly copyrighted works once the copyrights expire).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; supra text accompanying notes 49-66.
170. See Helprin, supra note 2; supra text accompanying notes 62-64; supra note 63.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; supra text accompanying notes 52-54, 65-66, 106120, 128-137.
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copyright on Winter's Tale. 172 Disney has fared even better regarding the
73
Steamboat Willie copyright and other nearly-as-old copyrights.
Enough is enough.
Congress should spurn calls for further extensions of copyright

duration. In doing so, Congress must resist the temptation to focus only
on the actual holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 174 in which the Supreme
Court sustained the CTEA against a constitutional challenge and
appeared to signal broad congressional latitude to extend copyright
duration without violating the Copyright Clause.1 75 Although Eldred
established this constitutional latitude, 176 Congress should not further
exercise it.
Congress should read between the lines of Eldred and consider the
messages the decision sent apart from its actual holding. The Court, for
example, hinted that the constitutional analysis might have been different
if it had appeared that Congress was trying to circumvent the Copyright
Clause's "limited times" language by stringing together successive
extensions. 177 This hint should make Congress wary of future extensions
and the potential they might create for an appearance that extensions
were being strung together as a convenient way of getting around the
78
"limited times" constraint. 1
There is another critical message for Congress to heed: the clear
indication in Eldred that even though the CTEA was constitutional, it
79
was poor public policy. As to this message, the Court was unanimous.
When Congress thinks about Eldred, it should focus more on this
unanimous message than on the 7-2 holding that the unwise CTEA was
constitutional.' 8 ° Eldred seems to reflect a majority that did not want to

172. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24. The twenty-year bonus stemmed
from the CTEA, which substituted a life-plus-seventy-year duration rule for the life-plusfifty-year rule that existed when Mr. Helprin wrote his novel. See id.; 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33; supra note 166. See also supra notes
28-30 (duration provisions in 1909 Act, 1976 Act, and 1998 CTEA).
174. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S 186 (2003).
175. Id. at 199-200, 204-05, 208, 212-13, 216-19, 221-22.
176. It can be argued that the Court erred in this regard. See, e.g., Langvardt &
Langvardt, supra note 5, at 236-70. Nevertheless, the Court provided Congress with
plenty to consider. See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
177. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-200, 209, 209-10 & n.16.
178. See id. Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent that Congress may have been
engaging in such action when it enacted the CTEA. See id. at 255-56 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Might other Justices decide to take such a position regarding future
extensions, if Congress enacts them? Cover for such a position could be provided by the
Eldred majority's hint, as identified in the text to which this note is appended.
179. Id. at 208, 222 (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion subscribed to by seven Justices);
id. at 223-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 243-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 222.
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strike down the CTEA because of concern over the consequences that
might ensue, but also had little enthusiasm for the prospect that Congress
might again extend copyright duration.1 8'
Hence, the Court sent
Congress the hints discussed above-hints that Congress should not
ignore.

82

Duration extension proponents will no doubt trot out the big names
in support of their proposals. When it enacted the CTEA, Congress not
only did the bidding of major corporations such as Disney,183 but also let
itself be influenced by stars such as Bob Dylan, Don Henley, Quincy
Jones, and Carlos Santana.' 84 The stars' testimony in support of duration
extension bills appeared to carry significant weight with Congress at the
time the CTEA was enacted. 85 This was so even though their remarks
related more to the importance of copyright protection generally (and
who disagrees with that?) than to any added creative incentive furnished
by a duration extension. 86 If other big names join Mr. Helprin, will
Congress respond affirmatively to the call for yet another duration
extension?
Not if Congress maintains the post-Eldred sense of
187
embarrassment it should have. That, however, may be a big "if.',
VI. Conclusion
The CTEA was an ill-considered idea. Its twenty-year freeze of the
public domain amounted to poor public policy, as the Supreme Court
signaled in Eldred even though it upheld the statute against constitutional
181. See Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 218, 234, 257-59; Posner, supra
note 32, at 151-52, 154-55. See also supra note 71 (discussing the Court's reluctance to
declare the CTEA unconstitutional).
182. At the same time, Congress should give serious thought to mitigating the harm
done to the public domain by its previous duration extensions, see supra text
accompanying notes 25-34, 56-59, and by the other blows it has struck at the public
domain, see supra note 56. A sensible way to do so would be to institute a requirement
that copyright owners pay a very nominal fee at designated intervals as a condition of
maintaining the full copyright duration now contemplated by the Copyright Act. See
Lawrence Lessig, ProtectingMickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003,
at A17. Further discussion of the merits of such a requirement is beyond the scope of this
Article. See id. (for a discussion). Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 270-72;
Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1597, 1603-04 (2004); Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 69, at
2410.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
184. Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 238-39, nn. 280-82.
185. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207-08 n.15 (2003).
186. See Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 5, at 238-39, nn. 280-82; Eldred, 537
U.S. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Acknowledging that his view of the future may not be widely shared, one
commentator has predicted that Congress will not continue to extend copyright duration.
See Leaffer, supra note 182, at 1603. I hope he is a good prognosticator, but all bets are
off.
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attack. The error of the CTEA should not be repeated when high-profile
copyright owners, such as Mark Helprin, ask for further extensions of
copyright duration. If Congress again does the bidding of the duration
extension proponents and implements the successive extensions charade
described earlier, even the Court that strained in Eldred to label the
CTEA constitutional, though unwise, could take a less deferential view
of congressional actions under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
We are stuck with the CTEA, of course, but further extensions are
not inevitable if Congress considers the full range of interests
contemplated by Article I, Section 8. Congress should now pay longoverdue attention to the public's rights in the grand copyright bargain by
resisting current and future calls to have the copyright duration extension
beat go on and on and on.

